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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between trade policy and growth using a
dynamic panel regression model with GMM estimates for data on 44 developing
countries over 1980-1999. Trade policy is captured by measures of tariffs, import and
export taxes. Typically, the average effects of changes in such policy variables have
been investigated. However, from a policy perspective, the differential effects on high-
or low-income countries may be of more interest. Our preferred specification for
growth thus includes as an explanatory variable an interaction term between trade
barriers and initial income levels to capture the non-linearity in the relationship. This
specification reveals a significant interaction effect under which the marginal impact
of tariffs on growth is declining in initial income. In particular, for low-income
countries tariffs appear to be associated with higher growth, whereas only for middle-
income and richer countries is there a negative impact of tariffs on growth. The impact
of a marginal change in protection on growth changes from positive to negative as
income increases beyond a threshold level of GDP per capita (below which, in rough
terms, a country would be classed as low-income). Put differently, trade liberalisation
seems to offer the possibility of achieving faster growth only in relatively richer
countries.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For many years, particularly following World War II, economists and policy makers
have discussed the impact of trade barriers on economic performance. There are
compelling theoretical reasons to believe that trade liberalisation would stimulate
economic growth (see Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001), Grossman and Helpman
(1991) and Lucas (1988)). However, there are also some endogenous growth models in
which protection of the domestic market is growth-promoting (see Lucas (1988);
Young (1991); Grossman and Helpman (1991); Matsuyama (1992); Srinivasan
(2001)). As Harrison (1996) points out, the endogenous growth theorists do not predict
that free trade will unambiguously raise economic growth - increased competition
could, for example, discourage innovation by lowering expected profits. The foregoing
discussion suggests that it is impossible to sign the effect of trade liberalisation on
growth unambiguously based on theoretical considerations alone. The impact of trade
policy on economic growth remains a matter of empirical testing.
Empirically, the evidence is mixed; some studies have found that a country’s rate of
economic growth is positively correlated with its openness to international trade, while
others have failed to demonstrate any role for trade liberalisation in spurring economic
growth. In the last decade, in particular, considerable attempts have been made to
measure the effects of both trade and trade policy on per capita income and income
growth. Most of the cross-country empirical literature seems to support the view that
trade liberalisation (or openness) leads to more rapid growth and that economic growth
results in poverty reduction, as exemplified in the influential papers by Sachs and
Warner (1995) and Dollar and Kraay (2000 and 2001).
1 However, these studies
specifically, or the general empirical approach, have come under severe criticism
following the seminal work by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001). In a serious critical
review of the cross-country growth literature, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) contend
that the cross-country growth regressions are fraught with various methodological
shortcomings and hence the findings are less robust than claimed. The main criticisms
concern the unsatisfactory measures of openness commonly used in the cross-country
studies, the problem of disentangling the effects of trade liberalisation due to the
                                                
1 Other examples of such studies include Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Lee (1993), Edwards (1993,2
collinearity of trade policies with a myriad of other simultaneous factors and policies,
and other econometric difficulties including the statistically sensitive specifications
frequently adopted in the cross-country growth literature.
While several studies may have identified a positive correlation between trade policy
openness and growth, the direction of causation remains unclear. As Rodrik (1999)
argues, it may well be the case that faster growing economies become more open
rather than economies that become more open grow faster. Harrison (1996) concludes
that previous studies on the direction of causality between openness and growth have
generated mixed results, with causality being bi-directional. Rodríguez and Rodrik
(2001) hold the view that there has been a tendency to overstate the growth effect of
trade liberalisation. Rodrik (1999) further points to the existence of potential
contingency between trade policy openness and economic growth. He argues that the
benefits from openness are not unconditional but rather depend upon the availability of
complementary policies and institutions - rule of law, good macroeconomic policies,
adequate financial markets and functioning government institutions, implying a
contingent or nonlinear relationship between openness and growth. Along these lines,
Panagariya (2003) contends that openness is necessary but not sufficient for sustained
rapid growth.
Another criticism of many of the empirical studies is that they use measures of trade or
indices of openness, rather than using measures of trade policy. Measuring the extent
of trade policy openness has become one of the major challenges for studies involved
in the analysis of the growth effects of trade policy (Winters, 2004; Rodríguez and
Rodrik 2001; Pritchett 1996; Edwards 1993, 1998; Greenaway et al. 1998, 2002;
Milner and Morrissey 1999; Rodrik 1992, 1998, 1999). Research must confront the
fact that it is very difficult to obtain reliable direct measures of trade policy openness
across countries over time. Several approaches have been employed to circumvent the
problem, especially the use of indices of trade orientation that are constructed using
quantitative and qualitative judgments, e.g. Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995),
Harrison (1996), Edwards (1998), and Frankel and Romer (1999). Some studies
confuse trade outcome measures (trade volume or its components) with policy
                                                                                                                                            
1998), Harrison (1996), Frankel and Romer (1999) and Mbabazi et al. (2002).3
indicators, e.g. those that interpret the trade volume measure of openness, (exports +
imports)/GDP, as a policy indicator. “In the context of policy advice, trade policy
‘openness’ is most directly associated with a liberal trade regime (low tariffs, very few
non-tariff barriers etc.) but in fact that is rarely the concept used in empirical work”
(Winters, 2004: 4). Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) argue that the indicators of openness
used by researchers have crucial shortcomings in measuring the trade orientation of
countries and are therefore problematic as measures of trade policy.
2
Because of the disagreements that these previous studies have created about the
association between trade policy and growth, further research on this important subject
is warranted. Accordingly, this study investigates the impact of trade policy on
economic growth in developing countries during the period 1980-1999, based on a
dynamic panel regression model. We address the measurement concern by using three
alternative policy measures: average unweighted scheduled tariffs, import taxes (as a
percentage of imports, a measure of the average implicit tariff) and export taxes (as a
percentage of exports).
3 Furthermore, to allow for the differential effects on high- or
low-income countries, our preferred specification for growth includes an interaction
term between trade barriers and initial income levels to capture the non-linearity in the
relationship between trade barriers and growth. We address endogeneity concerns by
employing the GMM estimator. The focus of this study is to attempt to answer the
following empirical questions: Does trade policy openness cause economies which
liberalize to grow more rapidly than those which do not? Is the effect of trade
liberalisation felt equally across countries (rich and poor), or are there systematic
differences conditioned on income?
The quantitative results provide evidence of a robust, positive link between trade
policy and real per capita GDP growth. The relationship between tariffs and growth is
positive and significant across all alternative policy measures, but is not uniform
across countries at different stages of development. The results suggest the existence
of a contingent relationship under which the marginal impact of protection on growth
is declining in income. The richer the country, the more likely it is that protection
                                                
2 Indeed, while most economists would intuitively agree on the positive relationship between trade flows
and growth, the same cannot be said about the effects of trade barriers on growth.
3 These indicators have limitations as measures of trade policy (see Milner and Morrissey, 1999; Rodrik,4
reduces growth (tariffs are negatively associated with growth), whereas for poor
countries the more likely it is that trade protection will enhance growth (tariffs are
positively associated with growth). Thus, for two economies that belong to different
income groups (low and high), similar trade policies will have different effects on
economic growth. The results indicate that failure to recognise the contingency in the
relationship between trade policy and growth is partly responsible for the ambiguity in
the literature. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe a standard dynamic growth equation and present some preliminary statistics
from the data. The section further describes the econometric methodology we employ
for our estimations. In Section 3, we present evidence from cross-section, fixed effects
and from a dynamic panel data model based on the GMM estimator of trade barriers
and growth, and discuss the estimation results for various measures of trade
restrictions. In Section 4, we carry out some sensitivity analysis to test for the
robustness of our results. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2. SPECIFICATION  AND  DATA
2.1.  Modelling Issues and Approach
Consider the following standard growth equation
1 it it it i t it yy α βη λ ε − ′ ∆= + +++ x                                 (1)
where  it y  is per capita real GDP for country i in period t,  it y ∆  reflects the average
growth rate of per capita GDP,  1 it y −  is the initial per capita GDP, x is a vector of
determinants of economic growth,  i η  represents the unobserved country-specific
factors,  t λ  is a period-specific effect,  it ε
 
is the time-varying regression residual, and α
and  β  are parameters to be estimated. The subscripts i and t represent country and
time period, respectively. Clearly, equation (1) is a dynamic model with a lagged
dependent variable. Several approaches have been used to estimate (1) in the empirical
growth literature. As many economists have pointed out, the estimation of equation (1)
presents at least two main important econometric difficulties that may lead to
                                                                                                                                            
1999), but should capture the broad pattern of trade policy across countries and over time.5
inconsistent and biased estimates: omitted variable bias and endogeneity bias. In what
follows, we discuss how these problems arise and how the empirical literature has
sought to correct for both of the biases.
2.1.1. Cross-section OLS Estimation
The term  i η  is a permanent but unobservable country-specific effect and captures the
existence of other growth determinants that are not already controlled for by the vector
x (i.e. omitted variables). It is time invariant and generally captures such cross
sectional heterogeneity as differences in tastes or technology between countries. If the
country-specific parameter were not included in (1), random country-specific
fluctuations would be grouped into the regression residual  it ε . This would bias the
common error term. In the presence of any correlation between the right-hand side
variables and the country specific effect ( i η ), estimation methods such as OLS will not
be consistent.
4  This is evident from the fact that
( ) ( ) 12 1 1 1 0 i iy i it it i t it Ey E y ηη α β η λ ε −− − − − ′ = ++ + +≠ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ x                 (2)
Aside from omitted variable bias, cross-section growth regressions may suffer from
endogeneity problems. Note that the determinants of growth in the vector x can be
classified according to whether they are strictly exogenous, predetermined or
endogenous.
5 The vector x is strictly exogenous if it is uncorrelated with all past,
present and future realisations of  it ε . However, this assumption is rather too restrictive
and often times very difficult to justify. For example, an unanticipated shock to the
growth rate of an economy could have a contemporaneous effect on the rate of
investment or the level of openness, thus compromising the strict exogeneity of these
variables. Alternatively, it is reasonable to infer that a positive shock to economic
                                                
4 In a pure cross-sectional regression, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term.
However, in a dynamic growth regression the lagged dependent variable  1 it y − , will necessarily correlate
with   i η  and thereby result in biased coefficient estimates.
5 For a variable  it z  that belongs to the vector x ,  it z  is said to be endogenous if it is correlated with  it ε
and earlier shocks but uncorrelated with  1 it ε +  and subsequent shocks. By predeterminacy, we mean that
x and  it ε  are uncorrelated, but x may still be correlated with 
1 it ε −  and earlier shocks.6
growth in period  1 t −  will result in a higher level of openness or positively affect gross
domestic investment in period t. Endogeneity is a particular problem in studies that
relate growth to openness using trade outcome measures such as trade share of GDP.
Such openness measures could clearly be endogenous since both the export and the
import share seem likely to vary with income levels. Even direct trade policy
measures, such as average tariffs, are susceptible to potential endogeneity. O’Rourke
(2000) discusses a potential mechanism of reverse causation between direct trade
barrier measures and GDP growth. In his narrative, prices go up in booms, eroding the
share of import duties in total import values during a period when such duties were
collected as specific tariffs. Growth subsequently slows down in the slump following
the boom and prices fall, so that low tariffs are associated, spuriously, with poor
growth. Thus, trade barriers may present issues of reverse causality, especially because
protection may depend on economic growth. If reverse causality is not taken into
account, it can lead to bias in the estimated coefficients and incorrect inferences.
2.1.2. Within-Group (Fixed Effects) Estimation
The possibility of endogeneity together with the presence of country specific effects
correlated with some of the explanatory variables implies that estimation methods such
as OLS will not be consistent. A first step in obtaining consistent estimates is to
eliminate the country-specific heterogeneity. One approach is to employ the within-
group estimator by taking deviations with respect to individual country means.
However, when the model includes a lagged dependent variable the dynamic fixed-
effects model produces estimates that are inconsistent if N (number of ‘individuals’, or
cross section) is large relative to T (number of time periods), hence the fixed effects
estimator is biased (see Nickell (1981); Wooldridge (2002); and Baltagi, (1995)).
Specifically, the within-group estimator is biased downwards of the order  1
T  and this
bias declines as T  increases. As we will discuss later, in this study the number of time
periods is small ( 5 T = ) and thus the bias could be severe.
2.1.3. Generalized Method of Moments
The growth equation (1) can be rewritten equivalently as
1 it it it i t it yy α βη λ ε − ′ = ++ + + x                            (3)7
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) relies on first-differencing to eliminate unobserved individual-specific
effects ( i η ), and then uses lagged values of endogenous or predetermined variables as
instruments for subsequent first-differences. Thus, the GMM estimation procedure
simultaneously addresses the problems of correlation and endogeneity.
First-differencing equation (3) yields
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 2 1 1 it it it it it it it it yy y y αβε ε −− − − − ′ −= − + − + − xx                           (4)
However, eliminating the country-specific effect introduces a correlation between the
lagged dependent variable and the new error term. Due to the correlation between  1 it y −
and  1 it ε − , it can be shown that
() ( ) 12 1 0 it it it it Ey y εε −− − −− ≠                                     (5)
Also, as discussed above, the contemporaneous effects of growth shocks on the
determinants of growth will result in the presence of endogeneity arising mainly due to
the correlation between x and  it ε . This correlation arises since
() ( ) 11 0 it it it it E εε −− −− ≠ xx                                        (6)
To address the endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the
lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments under the
assumptions that there is no serial correlation in the error term  it ε  and the right-hand
side variables. We follow Easterly and Levine (2001) and DeJong and Ripoll (2004) in
addressing the issue of endogeneity by imposing the identifying restriction that the
determinants of growth (variables in the x vector) are predetermined.
6 The assumption
is that shocks to economic growth in period t-1 could affect, for example, physical
                                                
6 This is a testable hypothesis for which the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is reported with8
investment, human capital investment, population growth, our trade policy measures or
their interaction terms in period t. Given this assumption, an appropriate instrument
for the difference is the lagged value.
Given the shortcomings of the differenced estimator (Easterly and Levine, 2001), we
use the alternative systems estimator that estimates jointly the regression in differences
with the regression in levels, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998).
7 The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of
the assumption that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity
of the instruments. By construction, the test for the null hypothesis of no first-order
serial correlation should be rejected under the identifying assumption that the error is
not serially correlated; but the test for the null hypothesis of no second-order serial
correlation, should not be rejected. We use two diagnostics tests proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions, and whether the differenced residuals are second-order serially correlated.
Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests gives support to our model.
2.2. The Model
Our estimating equation in standard form is:
10 1 12 3 4
5
ln ln ln ln it it it it it it
it i t it
YY Y P O PI N VS E C
TPOLICY
δ δδ δ δ
δη λ ε
−− −= + + + +
++ + +
               (7)
where  it Y  is per capita GDP for country i during period t, and  1 it Y −  is the level of real
per capita GDP in country i at the start of period t. In addition to estimating (7) by the
system GMM estimator, we also report results obtained using two alternative
estimators: cross-sectional OLS and the panel within-group estimator. Equation (7)
imposes a uniform and linear restriction on the parameter  5 δ ; the average effect of
trade policy on growth. However, some theoretical models have indicated that the
growth effect of trade barriers may be contingent on the level of development (see
Lucas (1988), Young (1991) and Matsuyama (1992)). In other words, it is unnecessary
                                                                                                                                            
all regression results.
7 Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that when the lagged levels of the series are weakly correlated with9
to assume that all countries would derive the same benefits from trade liberalisation.
Equation (7) may thus suffer from an un-modelled contingency in the relationship
between trade barriers and growth (DeJong and Ripoll, 2004).
Hence, we extend the basic regression specification (7) to capture potential
contingencies in the relationship between trade barriers and growth. We use two
approaches in this regard.
10 1 12 3 4
56 1
ln ln ln ln
ln *
it it it it it it
it it it i t it
YY Y P O PI N VS E C
TPOLICY Y TPOLICY
δ δδ δ δ
δδ η λ ε
−−
−
−= + + + +
++ + + +
               (8)
First, in equation (8), we allow the growth effect of trade policy to differ for countries
at different stages of development by including in our baseline specification (7) an
additional explanatory variable constructed as the product of initial income and our
individual trade policy variables. The interaction term is meant to capture the
dependence of the growth effect of trade barriers on income, where income is used
here to proxy for overall level of development.
8 Evidence of a contingent relationship
is provided by a significant coefficient on the interaction term. In addition, we employ
an alternative technique to explore the potential contingency by specifying a regression
model under which we interact TPOLICY with a dummy variable for rich countries
(THERICH) constructed from the World Bank’s (July 2005) income-rank index.
9 This
specification is analogous to (8) except that we replace  1 ln * it YT P O L I C Y −  with the
new interaction term  * THERICH TPOLICY . We then consider the differential impact
of trade policy for rich and poor countries.
2.3. Data Description and Variable Selection
                                                                                                                                            
the subsequent first-differences, the differenced GMM estimator can provide biased results.
8 DeJong and Ripoll (2004) and Chang et al. (2005) are examples of empirical growth regressions where
initial income is interacted with some measure of openness for similar reasons. Sachs and Warner
(1997b) and Baliamoune (2002) interact openness with initial income to test the hypothesis that a
greater degree of openness is associated with a faster rate of convergence to the steady state.
9 The World Bank index categorized all countries into four income groups – low, lower-middle, upper-
middle and high income countries (see appendix for exact cut-off values corresponding to the indexes).
THERICH takes the value of one for middle and high income countries and zero otherwise.10
Annual data for 44 developing countries covering the period 1980-99 is used.
10 This is
the data used for the single cross-section analysis. For the panel estimations, we
construct an unbalanced panel by averaging the data over five non-overlapping four-
year time periods: from 1980-83 through 1996-99. Each country thus has a potential
maximum of five observations. Not all countries have data for all five time periods, but
the use of unbalanced panels may attenuate the effect of self-selection in the sample.
The final sample consists of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries, 11 Latin American
countries, 7 from East Asia, 4 from South Asia and 3 from the Middle East and North
Africa. The data comprise a heterogeneous group of countries in terms of size, level of
income, degree of openness, population, resource endowments and so on. The
countries covered and detailed variable definitions and sources are presented in Tables
A1 and A2 respectively in Appendix A.
The variables included in the model are widely accepted in the empirical growth
literature as core determinants of growth. The log of real GDP per capita at the
beginning of each 4-year period ( 1 ln t Y − ) is included to capture initial country-specific
effects or convergence effects.
11 If initial income captures convergence the expected
sign is negative (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). However, in a cross-country
regression it may capture country-specific initial conditions, and the sign could be
positive (Mbabazi et al. 2001). The coefficient on population growth (POP) is
expected to carry a negative sign. The coefficients on investment share of GDP (INV)
and human capital (SEC) are expected to be positive. In addition to this conditioning
set, we employ three alternative measures of trade policy (TPOLICY) – average
(unweighted) scheduled tariffs (TARIFF), and then for robustness checks we use
import taxes as a percentage of imports (MTAX) and export taxes as a percentage of
exports (XTAX).
12
Our dependent variable is the (period) growth of real per capita GDP. However, in the
single pure cross-sectional regressions, the dependent variable is the annual average
                                                
10 Our sample and time series are primarily determined by the availability of data on average tariff, our
main measure of trade policy.
11 In the case of the single cross-sectional regression, the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980 is used as
initial income.
12 Undoubtedly, one could consider large list of potential of growth determinants, but degrees of
freedom considerations and data constraints require us to be modest with the number of right-hand
variables.11
growth rate for the entire period 1980-99. There are at least two ways of measuring
economic growth in the empirical growth literature. Most commonly, cross-section
growth studies tend to use as dependent variable the growth rate of real GDP per capita
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data base (WDI). In the
empirical dynamic growth literature, however, the growth rate of GDP per capita is
often approximated by the logarithmic difference in GDP per capita.
13 Recall from
equation (7) that when the dependent variable is measured this way the logarithm of
initial GDP per capita ( 1 it Y − ) proxies for the lagged dependent variable; resulting in a
dynamic specification. However, when the growth series in the WDI is used as the
dependent variable, the dynamic model as in equation (3) requires that we include the
lagged dependent variable lagged growth ( 1 t Growth − ) in the right-hand side variables.
As is standard in the growth literature, the initial GDP per capita still appears in the
regression specification as an additional regressor. For comparison, we use both
approaches to measure the growth rate of per capita output in both the cross-section
and panel estimations.
2.2.1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure A1 in Appendix A plots the series for the two alternative measures of per capita
GDP growth used in the empirical literature. Similarly, Figure A2 also in Appendix A
is a graphical representation for a selected number of countries of the average within-
country growth rate over the entire period of the study. Clearly, in both cases, there are
obvious differences in the way growth is measured. Economic growth, as measured by
the World Bank (WDI 2003), is higher both within (except in a few countries, for e.g.
Congo Democratic Republic and Madagascar) and across countries. It would be
interesting to find out whether cross-country growth results are sensitive to the choice
of measurement of growth, the dependent variable. While we follow the largest strand
of the empirical dynamic growth literature by approximating growth by the log
difference of GDP per capita, we also report results in Appendix C for estimates
obtained using as our dependent variable the average annual growth rate as reported by
the WDI.
                                                
13 Hoeffler (2002), Tsangarides (2002) and DeJong and Ripoll (2004) and Chang et al. (2005) are recent
examples of studies where the logarithmic difference in GDP per capita is used as the dependent12
It is useful to examine simple descriptive statistics for the relevant policy measures
over the period under consideration (Tables 1 and 2). Table 1 displays correlations
between per capita GDP growth, trade share and the trade barrier measures. The simple
correlations suggest that while we can expect to find a positive and statistically
significant association between trade volumes (measured by the ratio of trade to GDP)
and growth, the unconditional relationship between trade barriers and growth is less
clear. There is evidence of a negative and statistically significant correlation in two
cases (export tax and import tax); for average tariff the correlation appears positive but
is not significantly different from zero. All three trade barrier indicators are positively
and significantly correlated with one another. However, all the trade barrier indicators
are negatively and significantly correlated with trade flows, suggesting that trade
barriers do limit trade. Given the positive relationship between trade share and growth,
the negative correlation between trade barriers and trade share suggests that trade
barriers are likely to be detrimental to growth. However, as the econometric estimates
that follow indicate, the relationship between trade barriers and growth is more
complex than these statistics imply.
Table 1: Correlation Matrix between Policy Measures
VARIABLE GROWTH TRADE (% GDP) TARIFF EXPORT TAX
GROWTH 1.000
TRADE (%GDP) 0.232 1.000
(0.001)
TARIFF 0.047 -0.372 1.000
(0.521) (0.000)
EXPORT TAX          -0.181 -0.200 0.145 1.000
(0.012) (0.005) (0.061)
IMPORT TAX -0.177 -0.328 0.511 0.182
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: p-values in parentheses
Table 2 provides information about the means and standard deviations of the main
variables for the entire sample and for the low-income and high-income sub-samples,
two aspects being of particular interest for our analysis. First, the statistics suggest that
structural and institutional weaknesses (as measured by low levels of human capital
                                                                                                                                            
variable.13
investment) are characteristics of poor countries. Human capital investment (as proxied
by secondary school enrolment) is relatively low in low-income countries. If indeed, the
gains from openness are conditional on the availability of other policy
complementarities or structural characteristics (such as the level of human capital) it is
not difficult to infer why openness can be detrimental to low-income countries. We
investigate this claim econometrically in Section 5. The second, message from Table 2 is
the apparent high trade restrictions (low openness) in low-income countries. All the
(three) alternative trade policy measures and the conventional openness measure
indicate that trade restrictions are still substantially higher in low income countries.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables (1980-99), by income group
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 220 1.26 3.59 -9.91 12.93
Income per capita [in logs] 220 6.83 1.24 4.57 10.14
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 190 43.06 23.15 2.93 102.00
Population growth 220 2.25 0.84 -2.75 6.53
Gross domestic investment 220 21.82 7.92 4.33 47.10
Average tariff 189 24.82 16.15 0.20 99.90
Import tax (% Imports) 194 14.10 8.05 0.27 46.77
Export tax (% Exports) 194 3.09 6.07 0.00 34.58
Trade volume (% GDP) 219 64.05 51.85 11.39 407.35
Low-income countries (32 observations)
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 160 0.79 3.62 -9.91 12.93
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 133 35.37 20.54 2.93 77.25
Average tariff 137 27.71 17.00 6.00 99.90
Import tax (% Imports) 137 16.05 8.07 1.85 46.77
Export tax (% Exports) 137 3.72 6.89 0.00 34.58
Trade volume (% GDP) 160 54.51 25.50 11.39 147.70
High-income countries (12 observations)
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 60 2.49 3.23 -5.30 8.10
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 57 60.99 18.61 20.35 102.00
Average tariff 52 17.21 10.45 0.20 47.00
Import tax (% Imports) 57 9.41 5.81 0.27 22.95
Export tax (% Exports) 57 1.55 2.86 0.00 10.90
Trade volume (% GDP) 59 89.92 85.97 14.11 407.35
Source: Authors’ calculations based on all 44 countries in our sample and then for low and high –
income countries respectively. Averages are taken of annual values for 1980-1999.
Table 3 replicates the information in Table 2 from a regional perspective. The two main
observations contained in Table 2 are equally valid for Table 3: Sub-Saharan Africa, the
poorest region, is the most protected. It is also the region with the lowest growth and
weakest institutional development. The opposite is true for East Asia. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the low income countries, in general, and SSA in particular, recorded the14
lowest average growth rate (0.79% per year) between 1980 and 1999. In fact, SSA
(excluding Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa) actually registered a negative average
growth rate over the period (-0.62% per year), compared with an average growth rate of
4.49% in East Asia.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables (1980-99), by region
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub-Saharan Africa
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 80 -0.62 3.60 -9.91 12.93
Average tariff 62 24.36 10.62 6.00 60.80
Import tax (% Imports) 63 18.44 6.49 4.64 36.28
Export tax (% Exports) 63 6.66 8.91 0.00 34.57
Trade volume (% GDP) 80 50.46 23.59 11.39 147.70
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 63 22.05 16.31 2.93 75.90
East Asia
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 35 4.49 3.43 -4.06 11.41
Average tariff 35 20.83 13.38 0.20 49.50
Import tax (% Imports) 33 6.63 4.52 0.27 15.59
Export tax (% Exports 33 0.77 1.56 0.00 7.31
Trade volume (% GDP) 34 107.43 106.09 14.71 407.35
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 33 59.85 19.38 29.75 102.00
Latin America
Per capita GDP growth (annual %) 55 0.62 2.78 -5.92 7.15
Average tariff 46 17.64 8.78 8.00 47.00
Import tax (% Imports) 49 9.95 4.41 2.04 18.39
Export tax (% Exports) 49 1.35 2.62 0.00 10.90
Trade volume (% GDP) 55 59.31 27.55 14.11 131.50
Human capital investment (secondary enrolment) 49 53.29 16.06 21.18 85.10
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Averages are taken of annual values for 1980-1999. Sub-Saharan Africa excludes the three
middle-income countries –Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa.
These statistics reveal an unconditional negative effect of trade barriers and low human
capital on economic performance. There appears to be a complementarity between
human capital investment or lack thereof and trade policy reforms. It is clear from these
statistics that the growth effect of openness is heterogeneous, and may depend on the
structural and institutional characteristics of countries. We note also that the availability
and the degree of these institutions may be contingent on the level of development of a
country. High income countries are more likely to possess these structural and
institutional characteristics than low income countries.  For example, high-income
countries have almost twice the enrolments in secondary schools (61%) compared to
low-income countries (35%). The richest countries had higher education levels and also
had the lowest tariff barriers in the sample. On this basis, it is reasonable to expect that15
the growth response to trade liberalization may be contingent on whether a country is
rich or poor.
 We test this hypothesis econometrically in the next section of this paper.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the cross-country econometric results, based on estimates of
equations (7) and (8). Tables 4, 5 and 6 report coefficient estimates obtained from the
growth regressions where we measure trade policy (TPOLICY) by average tariff
(TARIFF), import tax (MTAX) and export tax (XTAX) respectively. In each of the three
tables, we present estimates from the baseline specification (7) in columns 1-3 under
which we model the relationship between trade barriers and growth as linear (i.e.,
without interaction between trade policy and initial income) in all the regressors. In
this basic specification only linear effects are allowed – the average growth effect of
trade policy. For this simple linear specification, we report comparative results from
estimates obtained from cross-section (column 1), within-group (column 2) and
system GMM (column 3) estimators. Column 4 in Tables 4-6 presents estimates from
a non-linear specification (8) intended to establish whether the relationship between
trade policy and growth is contingent on the level of income by introducing an
interaction term between the respective policy measures and initial income. This
specification relies on the more efficient system GMM estimator. Various diagnostic
tests are reported alongside the coefficient estimates in all tables.
While the estimated coefficients of other explanatory variables may be of interest, we
restrict our attention to the discussion of the estimated effects of trade policy on
growth.
14 We are interested in whether changes in trade policy have significant and
homogeneous effects on income growth. We summarize our main results below. As
shown in Tables 4 to 6, we only find statistically significant effects for our trade policy
measures when using the GMM estimator. In the main, our results from the three
linear specifications (columns 1 through 3) are not inconsistent with the state of the
                                                
14 Aside the trade policy measures, the most robust variables in our regressions are investment, the
growth rate of population and human capital. Human capital investment (SEC) has the intuitive sign and
statistically significant most of the time. As found by Levine and Renelt (1992), investment is a
fundamental determinant of cross-country growth. As predicted by the Solow growth model, the growth
rate of population is negatively correlated with per capita GDP growth.16
literature on trade restrictions and growth. Regardless of the estimator used, it is
difficult to find a consistent effect of trade barriers on growth in a ‘global’ cross-
country regression.
Table 4
 Trade Policy -TARIFF - and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                                 SIMPLE LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS                       INTERACTION
                     [1]                      [2]                 [3]                   [4]
                    CROSS SECTION         WITHIN GROUP      SYS-GMM             SYS-GMM
t-1 lnY    -0.2536** -2.1279*** -0.0290***           0.0095
                    (0.1230) (0.6316) (0.0071)           (0.0074)
POP               -0.4914** -0.2033 -0.0474***         -0.0368***
                    (0.1907) (0.3665) (0.0068)           (0.0112)
INV                    0.0936***  0.1459***  0.0088***           0.0093***
                    (0.0149)           (0.0307) (0.0004)           (0.0005)
SEC                    0.0034  0.0234  0.0019***           0.0020***
                    (0.0069)        (0.0213) (0.0005)           (0.0005)
TARIFF                 0.0038 -0.0168 -0.0000              0.0134***
                    (0.0086)        (0.0127) (0.0003)           (0.0018)
TARIFF* t-1 lnY                                                         -0.0021***
                                                                 (0.0003)
Constant                        0.9065 11.5958***  0.0903*           -0.2099**
                 (1.1204)        (3.9702) (0.0462)           (0.0786)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                        0.3941 -0.0147***         -0.0027
                                               (0.2809) (0.0047)           (0.0122)
1988-91                           0.3549  0.0092***           0.0141*
                                (0.3070) (0.0033)           (0.0073)
1992-95                          0.2556 -0.0324***         -0.0193***
                                (0.3750) (0.0048)           (0.0051)
1996-99                           0.3286 
                                (0.5376)
R
2 Adjusted                     0.64             0.20
Sargan Test    [0.475]        [0.901]
1
st-order serial correlation        [0.084]       [0.090]
2
nd-order serial correlation     [0.538]       [0.653]
Observations                          44           165              136                 136
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses while p-values in brackets, *; **; and *** denote significant at 10%;
5%; and 1% respectively.
2. The Sargan test is for the validity of the set of instruments.
3. The tests for 1
st (m1) and 2
nd (m2) - order serial correlation are asymptotically distributed as standard
normal variables (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). The p-values report the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis of serial correlation, where the first differencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the
time-varying component of the error term in levels is a serially uncorrelated disturbance.17
Table 5
Trade Policy -MTAX - and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                                   SIMPLE LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS                    INTERACTION
                    [1]                   [2]                        [3]                        [4]
                  CROSS-SECTION          WITHIN-GROUP     SYS-GMM           SYS-GMM
t-1 lnY               -0.2488** -2.8285*** -0.0025**              0.0222***
                    (0.1118)          (0.6940) (0.0012)        (0.0043)
POP               -0.5446*** -0.2721 -0.0437***    -0.0299***
                    (0.1747)        (0.4167) (0.0065)        (0.0050)
INV                    0.0981***  0.1656***  0.0097***      0.0096***
                    (0.0152)       (0.0316) (0.0005)        (0.0007)
SEC                    0.0030  0.0306  0.0005***      0.0012***
                    (0.0068)       (0.0195) (0.0002)        (0.0002)
MTAX                   0.0160 -0.0287 -0.0009**         0.0177***
                    (0.0143)        (0.0299) (0.0004)        (0.0023)
MTAX* t-1 lnY                                                         -0.0026***
                                                              (0.0004)
Constant              0.7784         15.8223*** -0.0529**       -0.3101***
                    (0.9128) (4.4945) (0.0208)        (0.0392)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                        0.4150 -0.0098
                                               (0.2773) (0.0101)
1988-91                           0.3478  0.0118*          0.0162***
                                (0.2907) (0.0066)        (0.0060)
1992-95                           0.3153 -0.0263***      -0.0151**
                                (0.3456) (0.0023)        (0.0060)
1996-99                           0.6030            0.0118*
                                (0.5433) (0.0060)
R
2 Adjusted      0.65             0.25
Sargan Test   [0.722]   [0.769]
1
st-order serial correlation     [0.068]   [0.085]
2
nd-order serial correlation      [0.581]   [0.751]
Observations                        44            171             132            132
Notes: Same as for Table 4.18
Table 6
Trade Policy -XTAX - and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                                 SIMPLE LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS                       INTERACTION
                  [1]                    [2]                              [3]                 [4]
               CROSS-SECTION     WITHIN-GROUP              SYS-GMM            SYS-GMM
t-1 lnY             -0.2649**     -2.8368***  0.0013           0.0119***
                  (0.1100)            (0.6924) (0.0019)        (0.0025)
POP           -0.5101***     -0.2036 -0.0360***      -0.0313***
                 (0.1749)         (0.4159) (0.0054)        (0.0034)
INV                 0.0983***      0.1660***  0.0086***        0.0102***
                 (0.0155)            (0.0315) (0.0004)        (0.0007)
SEC                 0.0043      0.0345*  0.0011***        0.0002*
                (0.0069)            (0.0196) (0.0003)        (0.0001)
XTAX                0.0193     -0.0426  0.0022**         0.0113***
                 (0.0199)            (0.0350) (0.0008)            (0.0020)
XTAX* t-1 lnY                                                        -0.0016***
                                                              (0.0004)
Constant           0.9104    15.3185*** -0.1143***      -0.1852***
                 (0.8853)           (4.4312) (0.0389)        (0.0097)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                             0.3769     -0.0158***      -0.0197**
                                                  (0.2739) (0.0054)        (0.0075)
1988-91                              0.1994  0.0073         -0.0005
                                   (0.3035) (0.0060)        (0.0067)
1992-95                              0.2310 -0.0279***      -0.0356***
                                   (0.3577) (0.0042)        (0.0028)
1996-99                              0.6037
                                   (0.5342)
R
2 Adjusted     0.64                        0.25
Sargan Test    [0.473]   [0.910]
1
st-order serial correlation       [0.071]  [0.057]
2
nd-order serial correlation       [0.503]  [0.579]
Observations                    44              171              132            132
Notes: Same as for Table 4.
Using OLS, we find a positive but insignificant effect for all our trade policy measures.
In contrast, the within group estimator provides negative estimates for all three
measures, which are likewise not significantly different from zero. Generally, the
coefficients provided by the system GMM are estimated more precisely than the OLS
and within-group estimates and in most cases the estimated coefficients are statistically
significant. Thus, the remainder of the discussions in this paper refers to the parameter
estimates obtained using the GMM.19
We proceed by discussing the global relationship observed between trade barriers and
growth given the exclusion of the interaction term from our baseline specification (7).
In Table 4 (column 3) TARIFF enters negatively but the estimated coefficient is not
significantly different from zero. MTAX however, enters Table 5 negatively and is
statistically significant while XTAX has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient in Table 6. The results provide evidence of a globally ambiguous
relationship between trade barriers and growth. When TPOLICY alone is introduced
into the growth regression it has inconsistent signs, suggesting that it is sensitive to
how trade policy is measured. This result is obviously worrying, but it is the kind of
result that dominates the previous empirical cross-country growth literature. It would
be appropriate to recognise that countries are heterogeneous in many respects, not least
that some are poor while others are rich. It is reasonable to expect the growth effect of
trade policy to differ for rich and poor countries. Anecdotal evidence and our
descriptive analysis do not lend support to the notion that all countries derive similar
benefits from international trade. This evidence precludes the use of simple linear
models to investigate the openness-growth relationship in a cross-country framework.
It would be interesting and proper to explicitly allow the impact of trade policy to
differ across countries in different income groups and at different stages of
development.
We now discuss the relationship observed between trade policy and growth, given the
inclusion of the interaction term in our baseline specification (column 4 of Tables 4 to
6). An interesting story emerges. TPOLICY (regardless of how it is measured) now
enters consistently with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, but the
interaction term is significantly negative in all cases. This specification reveals a
significant interaction effect under which the marginal impact of trade barriers on
growth is decreasing in initial income. These results imply that the impact of trade
barriers on growth is a function both of the level of restriction and of the level of
income. From equation (8), the derivative of growth with respect to trade policy is
calculated as










∂                          
(9)20
implying that the effect of a change in TPOLICY on GROWTH depends on the value of
the conditioning variable, the logarithm of initial GDP per capita ( 1 ln it Y − ).We know
from the fact that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative that the positive
effect of trade barriers declines as the level of income increases. These results suggest
potential threshold effects and non-linearity in the relationship between trade
protection (and by implication liberalization) and growth. We illustrate this with
Figure A3 in Appendix A, which plots the impact of a marginal change in protection
on growth for each of the three trade policy measures against real GDP per capita for
our sample. The results are quite revealing. For all the alternative trade policy
measures, the marginal effect of protection changes from positive to negative as
income increases beyond the threshold level of GDP per capita. Focusing on TARIFF,
the top panel of Figure A3 reveals a threshold at the level of income equivalent to
approximately $590 per capita (in constant international prices, base year 1985), above
which the relationship between protection and growth is negative and below is
positive.
15 Therefore, in principle, trade protection retards growth and liberalization is
growth-promoting once a country has reached the threshold level of GDP per capita.
Put differently, the results suggest that trade protection appears to assist (even protect)
growth in low-income countries. A corollary is that trade liberalization will not, in
general, have an unambiguous effect on growth. Trade liberalisation seems to offer the
possibility of achieving faster growth only in relatively richer countries.
Sachs and Warner (1997b) offer other explanations for the sign and significance of the
coefficient on the interaction term. Based on a static cross-sectional model with
interaction between openness and initial income, the authors conclude that higher
openness facilitates convergence; such that more open economies grow faster than
closed economies. This conclusion is based on the estimated positive coefficients on
both openness and the openness-initial income interaction term. In contrast, while our
estimated ‘average’ coefficient on initial income is largely negative and significant
(confirming the conditional convergence hypothesis), in the specifications where initial
                                                
15 All the SSA countries in our sample (except South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Cote
d’Ivoire and Congo Republic), Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Nicaragua were below this threshold level
during the period 1996-99. When MTAX is used as our preferred measure of protection (see middle
panel of Figure A3) the threshold level of per capita income increases to $905. When XTAX is used
instead (see bottom panel of Figure A3) the threshold level of per capita income increases further to
$1,167. In both cases, all the SSA countries in our sample (except South Africa, Botswana and21
income is interacted with trade policy the estimated coefficient on initial income turns
positive and significant, implying divergence. This has an interesting interpretation in
light of the fact that the interaction term is always negative: the process of convergence
seems to be determined, in part, by the trade regime - closed economies diverge more
slowly than open economies.
This finding together with the results in Table 7 (below) contradicts the claim by Sachs
and Warner (1997b) that open economies converge faster than closed economies.
16
Our results are, however, consistent with the findings by Baliamoune (2002) who
suggests the possibility of a threshold effect in the impact of openness on growth.
Applying panel fixed effects estimation methods to a sample of African countries
covering the period 1980-99 (the same period as in our case); Baliamoune estimates a
negative and statistically significant coefficient on openness (as measured by the share
of trade in GDP). In a separate specification that includes an interaction between
openness and initial income, she estimates a negative coefficient on the interaction
term, concluding that ‘globalization may be good but only for those countries that are
not among the poorest group’ (Baliamoune, 2002:7).
Table 7 reports results for the case where we experiment by using the conventional
openness measure, OPEN (the ratio of trade volume [exports + imports] to GDP) in
equation (8). As with Tables 4-6, we interact OPEN with the log of initial income to test
(1) the hypothesis that open economies grow faster and (2) the robustness of our finding
that openness is beneficial only when incomes are low. Perhaps surprisingly, the results
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 contradict the commonly held view that
openness is good for growth. Moreover, the findings do not support the idea that more
open low-income countries converge faster than closed countries. Our results are,
however, completely consistent with the previous results in Tables 4 to 6 – where we
use actual trade policy measures. Our findings also corroborate the work by Baliamoune
(2002). We consider the result in Table 7 as a further robustness check for our results.
                                                                                                                                            
Mauritius) fell below the relevant threshold level during the period 1996-99.
16 The inconsistency in our results may be due to differences in the samples, time period, estimation
techniques and how trade policy openness is measured. The Sachs and Warner (1997b) study covers a
pooled sample of 83 developed and developing countries for the period 1965-1990. Single cross-section
OLS estimation techniques are used and trade openness is measured by the Sachs and Warner (1995)
index.22
Table 7
Trade Openness and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                                   SIMPLE LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS                     INTERACTION
                  [1]                   [2]                        [3]                       [4]
                  CROSS-SECTION          WITHIN-GROUP     SYS-GMM           SYS-GMM
t-1 lnY            -0.2603** -2.5311***  0.0061         -0.0190*
                 (0.1240) (0.6112) (0.0048)        (0.0102)
POP            -0.5106*** -0.0515 -0.0208***      -0.0472***
                 (0.1813)        (0.3711) (0.0064)        (0.0104)
INV                 0.0970***  0.1659***  0.0097***        0.0106***
                 (0.0182)        (0.0298) (0.0005)        (0.0005)
SEC                 0.0027  0.0237  0.0010***        0.0006
                 (0.0070)        (0.0183) (0.0002)        (0.0004)
OPEN             -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0005***      -0.0050***
                 (0.0023)        (0.0085) (0.0001)        (0.0002)
OPEN* t-1 lnY                                                           0.0005***
                                                              (0.0000)
Constant           1.0886 13.0909*** -0.1576***        0.0969
                 (0.9631)        (3.8959) (0.0396)        (0.0601)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                        0.3753 -0.0196***           
                                               (0.2619) (0.0034)
1988-91                           0.4821*   0.0073           0.0240***
                                (0.2843) (0.0055)        (0.0047)
1992-95                          0.5202 -0.0269***      -0.0032
                                (0.3406) (0.0047)        (0.0056)
1996-99                           0.8437  0.0238***
                                (0.5316) (0.0041)
R
2 Adjusted      0.64            0.26
Sargan Test   [0.258]                [0.705]
1
st-order serial correlation      [0.062]   [0.079]
2
nd-order serial correlation      [0.887]  [0.802]
Observations                     44          188             147            147
Notes: Same as for Table 4.
4. FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section examines the robustness of our results with respect to several further
modifications of our model. First, both the Sargan and serial-correlation tests indicate
that the null hypothesis of correct specification cannot be rejected, lending support to
our estimation results. Recall that we assumed that the right-hand side variables in
equation (8) (including the trade policy measures and their interaction terms) are not23
strictly exogenous. The Sargan test of the null hypothesis for over-identifying
restrictions (that all regressors are predetermined) is not rejected at the 0.05 level of
significance for all regressions. This suggests that the over-identifying restrictions are
valid. The p-values in the test for second order serial correlation indicates that we
cannot reject (at 0.05 level) the null hypothesis that there is no second order serial
correlation in the differenced residuals, suggesting consistency of our estimates.
Further, we explore whether the dependency of the growth effects of protection on
income also extends to other policy variables. The relevant question is: What does
initial income ( 1 ln it Y − ) capture? Some commentators have argued that trade policy
reforms require other complementary policy reforms such as investment in human
capital or institutions (see Rodrik, 2000; Chang et al. 2005). The concern is that initial
income may be a proxy for such critical institutions and thus it is the availability of
such institutions that matter and not whether a country is rich or poor. Indeed, our
descriptive analysis of the data in Section 2.3.1 (see Table 2) suggests a high
correlation between being a low-income country and having low levels of human
capital, one of the most important country characteristics in our regressions. Being
sceptical about the role of initial income, we perform two exercises to explore the
robustness of the contingency established with initial income.
In the first exercise, we hypothesize that initial income may be a proxy for a country’s
overall level of development and is thus strongly related to the country-specific
characteristics critical for growth and development. We arbitrarily select one such
country characteristic - human capital investment - and interact it with our trade policy
measures, the results of which we report in Table B2 in Appendix B. The coefficient on
the interaction between all alternative policy measures and human capital (SEC) is
negative and significant. This indicates that the growth effect of higher protection (in
low-income countries) is diminished when investment in human capital is higher.
Alternatively, trade liberalization is more likely to be beneficial when human capital
investment is high. This result could be viewed as an indictment of the contingency
result established with initial income. Hence, we now test empirically whether the
results in Tables 4-6 remain robust to the introduction of the interaction between our
alternative trade policy measures and human capital into the regression specification (8).24
Our goal here is to verify the robustness of the TPOLICY*SEC interactions in Table B2
once we account for the TPOLICY* 1 ln t Y −  dependence. In essence, we are interested in
checking whether the growth effect of protection is dependent on country characteristics
independent of dependence on the overall level of development. In all cases (Table B2
column 2) the inclusion of the income interaction term displaces the statistical
significance of the coefficients of the interaction between trade policy and human
capital. Interestingly, the income interaction remains significantly negative, indicating
that whether a country is rich or poor determines the growth impact of trade policy
openness. This is a plausible result since the overall level of development or the income
rank of a country is a good indicator of (and may be capturing) the level of development
in several important dimensions, such as the availability of public infrastructure,
financial depth and governance. Whilst obviously important, human capital alone could
not be the determinant of the effect of trade protection on growth. It is the overall level
of development, whether a country is rich or poor, that matters.
In the second exercise on the robustness of the income interaction, we employ an
alternative technique to explore the potential contingency already established by our
results in Tables 4-7 and Table B2.
17 To test for the robustness of the existence of
contingency, we follow DeJong and Ripoll (2004) (but with an updated version of the
World Bank income classification table) by specifying a regression model under which
we interact trade policy with the World Bank’s (July 2005) income-rank index with
low-income countries ranked as 1, lower-middle income countries ranked as 2, upper-
middle income ranked 3 and high-income ranked as 4 (see Appendix A for exact cut-
off values corresponding to the indexes). We then consider the differential impact of
trade policy for high and low–income countries. The results reported in Table B1
suggest that the impact of trade restriction (or openness) on growth, given the level of
protection (or volume of trade), will be different for countries classified as relatively
rich compared to those classified as poor. For all alternative measures the results are
broadly consistent with the finding of a contingent relationship under which the
marginal impact of trade policy (openness) is decreasing (increasing) in initial income.
                                                
17 While the choice of initial income as a proxy for ‘overall level of development’ generates interesting
results, it is not unique. One could think of other initial conditions that could as well describe the
development (or income) status of a country.25
The sign and significance of this interaction term confirms our earlier finding of the
importance of a country’s rank on the income ladder in determining the effect of trade
policy on growth. We consider this as a robustness check for our results. The results
suggest that an important missing link in the previous literature is the failure to account
for this apparent contingency.
Finally, we performed diagnostic tests for influential observations to confirm that the
parameter estimates are not unduly influenced by a small subset of observations. Our
examination of the data for the presence of outliers, high-leverage points or influential
observations using the DFFITS statistic (Besley et al., 1980) identified Singapore,
Nicaragua, Congo Democratic Republic and Congo Republic as high-leverage and
influential.
18  However, the omission of all four observations does not affect the fit and
hence the estimated coefficients in Tables 4 to 6. We present the parameter estimates
from the regression without the four outliers in Table B3 in Appendix B. Both the
signs and orders of magnitude of the coefficients are preserved in most cases. Thus the
model parameters are robust in that they show little sensitivity to changes in the model
specification and to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers. We still find convincing
evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between trade barriers
and economic growth which is contingent on income.
                                                
18 Suppose  X  denotes the matrix of explanatory variables in our model and 
i x the  th i element of  X ,
containing observations on household i . Letting  ()
-1 PX X XX ′ ′ =  denote the associated hat matrix,
the leverage statistic for observation i , which is the  th i diagonal element of P , is
()
-1
ii i i p xX X x ′ ′ = ,   1,2,..., . iN =  This measures the distance of  
i x  from the centre of mass from
the other rows of P . If 
i r  denotes the studentized residual of observation i , the 











. In our empirical application, we identified potential outliers as
observations with associated DFFITS statistic  11 ii p − <> . This identification procedure was
consistent with two other alternative diagnostic measures used – Cook’s Distance (Cook, 1977) and
Welsch’s Distance (Welsch, 1982).26
 5. CONCLUSION
Our primary result concerned the effect of trade liberalisation on economic growth for
the poorer countries. In this regard, we examined the relationship between a variety of
trade policy measures and growth. We find that trade protection has, on average, a
robust positive effect on economic performance for low-income countries in general.
Trade liberalisation thus seems to offer the possibility of achieving faster growth only
in relatively richer countries. The richer the country, the chances are that trade
liberalisation will be growth-enhancing and the poorer the country the more likely that
trade protection will affect growth positively. Thus, for two economies that belong to
two different income groups (low and high), similar trade policies will have different
effects on growth. The results suggest that richer countries with lower tariffs tend to
grow faster than countries with only one of these attributes. The corollary that poorer
countries with lower tariffs grow slower is equally supported.
Our findings suggest that studies that have sought to explain the openness-growth
relationship in terms of conventional linear models may be misleading. The
conventional  average effect of trade liberalisation tends to mask interesting
heterogeneity in the individual responses of countries to trade liberalisation. In our
sample of 44 developing countries pooled over 20 years, we find overwhelming
evidence of such nonlinearity. In particular, we find that the growth effects of trade
barriers may vary with the level of income from positive to negative, a possibility
ignored in many previous studies. This finding seems consistent with the intuitive
notion that low-income countries could increase growth by using tariffs based on the
infant industry argument. On the basis of the weight of evidence in this paper, we
suggest that it would be too simplistic to think that trade liberalisation per se is the key
to prosperity for all countries - liberalisation is not a ‘magic wand’. Despite being an
important determinant of growth, the potential benefits from trade liberalisation are not
automatic and poorer countries may actually be made worse off by it. Policy makers in
low income countries, SSA especially, should recognise that trade liberalisation alone
without accompanying complementary policies would be a sub-optimal policy option.27
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Appendix A: Data and Extensions




Burkina Faso Indonesia Sierra Leone
Burundi Jamaica Singapore*
Cameroon Kenya South Africa*
Chile* Korea Rep.* Sri Lanka
China Madagascar Thailand
Congo Dem. Rep. Malawi Tunisia
Congo Republic Malaysia* Uganda
Costa Rica* Mauritius* Uruguay*
Cote d'Ivoire Mexico* Venezuela*
Dominican Rep. Morocco Zambia
Ecuador Nepal Zimbabwe
Egypt Nicaragua
Countries marked with asterisk are classified by the World Bank as high-income (i.e. including ‘Upper
middle income’) countries (with gross GNI per capita of at least $3,256 in 2004. There are 12 ‘rich’
countries (upper-middle and high), 32 ‘poor’ countries (lower-middle and low) and 19 SSA countries
(of which all except 3 are ‘poor’ countries).
Table A2: Definitions and Sources of Data
Variable: Definition Source
GROWTH Real per capita GDP growth rate World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
1 ln t Y − Real per capita GDP at beginning of each
4-year period (in logs).
World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
OPEN Ratio of total trade (exports + imports) to
GDP.
World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
POP Population growth rate World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
INV Gross domestic investment World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
SEC Human capital investment (measured by
gross secondary school enrolment).
World Development Indicators (2003)
and Easterly (2001).
TARIFF Average scheduled tariff (unweighted) Data drawn from World bank.
MTAX Import duties as percentage of total
imports.
World Development Indicators (1999).
XTAX Export duties as percentage of total
exports.
World Development Indicators (1999).
THERICH Dummy variable with the value of unity
for upper-middle and high income
countries
and zero for all others.
Author’s construction using data from
World Bank (July 2005).
Unless stated otherwise, all data series are drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI, CD-ROM 2003
and 1999) and Easterly (2001) data series available as the Global Development Network Growth Database at the
web site www.worldbank.org/research/growth.  TARIFF data are from Ng Francis (2001) available at
http://publications.worldbank.org/catalog/content-download?revision_id=1526199. Last accessed 20th October
2004.32
Figure A1: Selected cross-country growth for the period 1980-99.













































































































































































































Annual average growth (WDI)
Log difference of GDP per capita
Source: Author’s with data from WDI 2003.
Figure A2: Cross-country growth series, 1980-99
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Source: Author’s with data from WDI 2003.33
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Taking a Closer Look within Countries









TARIFF to Income (%)
Singapore 9.749 9.870 0.123 -0.23
Korea Republic 8.903 9.090 0.051 -8.25
Argentina 8.868 8.871 0.006 -10.29
Uruguay 8.548 8.548 0.016 -10.35
South Africa 8.330 8.370 0.066 -6.42
Venezuela 8.173 8.083 0.075 -8.82
Chile 8.134 8.167 0.041 -5.93
Mexico 8.093 8.126 0.058 -6.01
Malaysia 8.077 8.138 0.008 -5.07
Costa Rica 8.030 8.070 0.005 -5.33
Mauritius 7.887 7.906 0.073 -10.70
Botswana 7.866 8.055 0.052 -8.29
Simple Average 8.388 8.441 0.048 -7.14
12 Poorest Countries
Ethiopia 4.654 4.596 0.012 7.21
Malawi 5.019 4.961 0.029 3.84
Burundi 5.205 5.211 0.066 4.03
Nepal 5.233 5.208 0.025 3.08
Congo Dem. Rep. 5.262 5.419 0.088 2.78
Burkina Faso 5.334 5.284 0.041 5.37
Uganda 5.567 5.390 0.135 1.75
Madagascar 5.581 5.597 0.011 0.51
Sierra Leone 5.601 5.753 0.017 1.30
Rwanda 5.606 5.667 0.051 1.88
Bangladesh 5.641 5.547 0.040 5.61
India 5.747 5.802 0.013 5.05
Simple Average 5.371 5.370 0.044 3.53
Note: Predictions are based on estimates from equation (8) using TARIFF as the preferred measure of
trade policy. The remaining 20 semi-poor countries are not reported for succinctness and clarity.
Despite the attempt to introduce heterogeneity in the effect of trade policy on growth,
it is reasonable to believe that average estimates do not provide enough information
about the within-country variance in the impact of trade policy on per capita income
growth. For most practical purposes, however, it may be useful to have some
information on individual country experiences. In Table A3 we show the 12 richest
and 12 poorest countries in our regression sample, along with their actual average per
capita GDP and their predicted average income from the regressions. In addition, we
estimate how much of the variations in within-country income is explained by trade
policy. The evidence suggests that trade policy plays an important role in explaining
within-country variations in income. Overall, the model explains reasonably well the
experience of all countries irrespective of the income group. The unexplained income35
(residual) is negligible in absolute terms. The main message from this table is that,
whereas for all the rich countries the contribution of tariffs is negative (-7.1% on
average), for the poorest countries tariffs (protection) are positively associated with
income (3.5% on average). Tariff reductions would by implication be beneficial
(harmful) to only the richest (poorest) countries, ceteris paribus.









TARIFF to Income (%)
Ethiopia 4.654 4.596 0.012 7.21
Malawi 5.019 4.961 0.029 3.84
Burundi 5.205 5.211 0.066 4.03
Congo Dem. Rep 5.262 5.419 0.088 2.78
Burkina Faso 5.334 5.284 0.041 5.37
Uganda 5.567 5.390 0.135 1.75
Madagascar 5.581 5.597 0.011 0.51
Sierra Leone 5.601 5.753 0.017 1.30
Rwanda 5.606 5.667 0.051 1.88
Kenya 5.823 5.766 0.060 1.13
Ghana 5.878 5.760 0.065 0.50
Zambia 6.159 6.158 0.018 -1.05
Zimbabwe 6.454 6.459 0.008 -1.28
Cameroon 6.633 6.627 0.031 -3.53
Cote d'Ivoire 6.714 6.563 0.101 -3.52
Congo Rep. 6.809 6.972 0.129 -3.79
Simple Average 5.769 5.761 0.054 1.07
Botswana 7.866 8.055 0.052 -8.29
Mauritius 7.887 7.906 0.073 -10.70
South Africa 8.330 8.370 0.066 -6.42
Simple Average (All) 6.125 6.132 0.056 -0.44
Table A4 replicates the same exercise for the 19 SSA sub-sample. Even within SSA
the effects of tariff is heterogeneous. The countries are arranged from the very poorest
to the least poor. What is interesting is that some SSA countries really appear as rich
countries in terms of the tariff effects. The three richest countries in SSA, South
Africa, Mauritius and Botswana all have strong negative tariff effects. Without these
three countries, tariffs contribute, on average, a percentage point to income. However,
once we include them in the SSA sample the contribution of tariffs turns negative,
albeit marginally (-0.4%). The results in Tables A3 and A4 provide evidence for the
view that the effects of trade policy on income, income growth and poverty are
heterogeneous, underscoring the need to avoid the search for average effects.36
Appendix B: Results for Robustness Checks
Table B1: Trade Policy and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                       INTERACTIONS WITH WORLD BANK INCOME CLASSIFICATION
                [TARIFF]                       [MTAX]               [XTAX]                [OPEN]
t-1 lnY                -0.0875***      -0.0043         -0.0196*        -0.0363***
                    (0.0122)        (0.0033)        (0.0114)        (0.0094)
POP               -0.0181         -0.0556***      -0.0402***      -0.0236**
                    (0.0134)        (0.0080)        (0.0069)        (0.0103)
INV                    0.0120***          0.0085***        0.0094***        0.0099***
                    (0.0006)        (0.0005)        (0.0007)        (0.0010)
SEC                    0.0029***          0.0006***        0.0012***        0.0027***
                    (0.0004)        (0.0002)        (0.0004)        (0.0005)
THERICH               0.2328***          0.1132***        0.0501***        0.0377
                   (0.0252)        (0.0233)        (0.0141)        (0.0297)
TARIFF                0.0021***
                   (0.0004)
TARIFF*THERICH            -0.0037**
                   (0.0016)
MTAX                               0.0011*      
                                              (0.0006)
MTAX*THERICH                                         -0.0132***
                               (0.0017)
XTAX                                                0.0039**
                                               (0.0017)
XTAX*THERICH                                          -0.0110***
                                               (0.0019)
OPEN                                                          -0.0009**
(0.0004)
OPEN*THERICH                                                0.0010**
                                                              (0.0004)
Constant               0.1914***       -0.0279           0.0103           0.0370
                 (0.0482)         (0.0271)        (0.0569)        (0.0522)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                            0.0013         -0.0147
                                 (0.0122)        (0.0114)
1988-91           0.0156***         0.0181**         0.0070           0.0224***
                              (0.0050)         (0.0073)        (0.0080)        (0.0061)
1992-95                       -0.0056          -0.0288***         -0.0344***      -0.0144**
                              (0.0112)         (0.0064)        (0.0049)        (0.0066)
1996-99                         0.0405***                                        0.0102
                              (0.0136)                                      (0.0085)
Sargan Test [0.800]          [0.823]  [0.869]   [0.819]
1
st-order serial corr. [0.074]          [0.059]  [0.054]    [0.060]
2
nd-order serial corr.           [0.627]         [0.728]  [0.624]    [0.895]
Observations            136                       132        132             147
Notes: Same as for Table 4.Table B2: Trade Policy and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999): Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                             [1]     [2]     [1]     [2]    [1]    [2]
                   TARIFF           TARIFF                MTAX                MTAX                XTAX                  XTAX
t-1 lnY             -0.0273***        0.0105         -0.0113            0.0290***        0.0058**         0.0046
                 (0.0052)          (0.0093)         (0.0096)         (0.0095)          (0.0023)        (0.0031)
POP            -0.0575***       -0.0429***       -0.0585***           -0.0393***           -0.0165***           -0.0326***
                   (0.0103)          (0.0119)          (0.0097)        (0.0071)       (0.0040)       (0.0053)
INV                  0.0094***         0.0100***         0.0103***         0.0101***        0.0099***        0.0091***
                  (0.0003)        (0.0005)         (0.0006)         (0.0005)        (0.0006)        (0.0005)
SEC                 0.0026***         0.0009**          0.0028***         0.0012**         0.0012***        0.0006**
                  (0.0003)         (0.0004)         (0.0004)         (0.0006)       (0.0002)        (0.0002)
TARIFF              0.0027***         0.0093***
                  (0.0006)         (0.0013)
TARIFF*SEC                 -0.0001***       -0.0000
                  (0.0000)         (0.0000)
MTAX                                               0.0092***         0.0169***
                                               (0.0008)         (0.0026)
MTAX*SEC                                              -0.0002***       -0.0001
                                                (0.0000)         (0.0000)
XTAX                                                                            0.0053***        0.0130***
                                                                             (0.0007)        (0.0025)
XTAX*SEC                                                                       -0.0001***        0.0000
                                                                             (0.0000)        (0.0001)
TARIFF* t-1 lnY                          -0.0012***
                                 (0.0002)
MTAX* t-1 lnY                                                          -0.0019***
                                                                 (0.0005)
XTAX* t-1 lnY                                                                                       -0.0023***
                                                                                            (0.0007)
Constant               0.0475         -0.1864**        -0.1200*         -0.3644***      -0.2204***      -0.1385***
                  (0.0557)        (0.0858)         (0.0641)         (0.0479)        (0.0140)        (0.0451)
Sargan Test   [0.716]   [0.927]   [0.836]       [0.807]  [0.919]  [0.958]
1
st-order serial correlation   [0.086]   [0.096]      [0.087]   [0.097]  [0.062]  [0.080]
2
nd-order serial correlation   [0.532]   [0.625]      [0.365]     [0.668]  [0.813]  [0.522]
Observations                     136             136             132                    132                   132     132
Notes: Same as for Table 4. Period dummies (not reported for succinctness) are included to capture the effects of cyclical impacts on growth.Table B3: Trade Policy and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999) –
Outliers Dropped: Dependent Variable is  it t-1 lnY -lnY
                       INTERACTIONS WITH WORLD BANK INCOME CLASSIFICATION
                           [TARIFF]                         [MTAX]                [XTAX]
t-1 lnY               0.0063         -0.0000         -0.0096
                 (0.0088)        (0.0091)        (0.0058)
POP               -0.0676***      -0.0420***      -0.0418***
                 (0.0145)         (0.0058)       (0.0077)
INV                0.0099***         0.0098***        0.0113***
                 (0.0005)         (0.0006)       (0.0007)
SEC                0.0009**          0.0008***        0.0001
                 (0.0004)         (0.0003)        (0.0002)
TARIFF                0.0126***
                 (0.0015)
TARIFF* t-1 lnY                 -0.0021***
                (0.0003)
MTAX                               0.0080**
                                (0.0034)
MTAX* t-1 lnY                              -0.0012**
                                (0.0005)
XTAX                                             0.0098***
                                               (0.0032)
XTAX* t-1 lnY                                            -0.0021***
                                               (0.0006)
Constant                             -0.0612         -0.0990         -0.0198
                 (0.1010)       (0.0698)        (0.0388)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                0.0101         -0.0088           0.0043
                               (0.0104)       (0.0088)       (0.0137)
1988-91                0.0305***        0.0151*          0.0170*
                 (0.0100)        (0.0089)        (0.0090)
1992-95               -0.0105***     -0.0216***      -0.0223***
                 (0.0038)        (0.0029)        (0.0058)
Sargan Test [0.881]        [0.956]    [0.976] 
1
st-order serial corr. [0.012]        [0.018]    [0.013]  
2
nd-order serial corr.           [0.566]       [0.728]    [0.774]  
Observations            125                     122             122        
Notes: Same as for Table 4.39
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Appendix C: Alternative Estimation
Before estimating the main model, we considered two prior experimentations with our
specifications, (7) and (8). Our first experiment involved estimating variants of (7) and
(8) under which we measure the dependent variable by the WDI annual growth series.
These specifications also included foreign direct investment (FDI) as an additional
explanatory variable but excluded human capital investment (SEC).
19 The sample in
this case involves 48 countries. The results obtained using the systems GMM
estimator, are reported in Tables C1 to C3 below. The baseline specification as in
column (1) and its variant as in column (2) are dynamically specified (with lags of per
capita GDP growth) and estimated using the GMM systems estimator. We find that our
trade policy measures enter consistently with a negative and statistically significant
coefficient, but the interaction term is significantly positive in all cases, which,
according to the theory, suggests a contingent relationship. The results suggest that
trade protection has, on average, a robust negative effect on economic performance for
low-income countries. Openness to trade seems to offer the possibility of achieving
faster growth with differing impacts on countries belonging to different income
groups.
It is possible that the results contained in Tables C1 to C2 are biased. Biases may result
from at least two sources –under and/or over specification and the choice of
measurement of the dependent variable. One issue is that FDI may not belong to the
model as it is incorporated in physical investment (INV), at least in principle.
20 The
second point is that it is quite difficult to justify the omission of human capital
investment (SEC) from the growth model, notwithstanding that the measure is not very
good.
21 The critical importance of human capital accumulation in the augmented
Solow model has been discussed by Lucas, (1988), Romer (1990) and Mankiw et al.,
(1992). It is also standard for recent cross-country empirical work based on the
neoclassical and endogenous growth models to include human capital as a determinant
                                                
19 There is evidence that FDI contributes to growth (Borensztein et al., 1998). Over the two decades
under study FDI has become the single largest capital flow to developing countries, far surpassing
portfolio equity investment, private loans, and official development assistance. The World Bank (2002)
reported that in 1997 developing countries received 36 percent of total FDI flows. However, for low-
income countries FDI tends to be low (aid is typically a much larger share of capital inflows)
20 If this is truly the case, the problem of collinearity can bias the results in Tables C1 to C3.
21 If SEC is really fundamental, excluding it from the model can cause omitted variable bias.  The use of
GMM however permits us to deal with this potential problem.40
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of growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) for example include investment in human capital
in their set  of  I-variables (i.e. the set of variables always included in growth
regressions). Indeed, virtually all the empirical growth papers cited in this paper
include in their models some measure of education, and human capital formation in
general. On the issue of how to measure growth, the concern is that using the WDI
growth rates as the dependent variable, and therefore (in GMM) including the lag of
growth as an explanatory variable, in a regression which already includes lagged GDP
per capita as a regressor may not be appropriate due to the high correlation between
lagged growth and lagged GDP per capita.
To examine if the growth effect of trade policy is sensitive to these concerns, our
second experiment involved re-estimating all the regressions but this time including a
measure of human capital investment, the rate of gross secondary school enrolment
(SEC), in our model.
22 We also take seriously the suggestion that FDI could in
principle be incorporated in INV by dropping the former from the model. Our sample
now reduces to 44 countries – Brazil, Guniea, Pakistan and St. Lucia are excluded
from the regressions for lack of data on SEC. For this experiment, we retain WDI
growth as our dependent variable. The results based on the system GMM are presented
in Tables C4 to C6. Surprisingly, the effect of trade barriers gets reversed controlling
for human capital and excluding FDI. Trade policy now enters consistently with a
positive and statistically significant coefficient, but the interaction term is significantly
negative in all specifications. This suggests that the omission of human capital from
the model and the ‘double-counting’ of physical investment (FDI and INV) were
possibly responsible for the negative tariff effect in the previous regressions. These
results are illuminating in light of the non-robustness of the previous literature. In part,
these results may help explain the ambiguity in the cross-country literature which has
sought to find the growth-effect of trade policy. Results can be extremely sensitive to
the control variables used in the models. Failure to control for important determinants
(which rightly belong to the model) and/or including irrelevant variables can be
dangerous as they can lead to biased results.
                                                
22 Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), Easterly (2001), Tsangarides (2002) and Chang et al. (2005) used
this variable as a proxy for human capital.41
41
Assuming that we wanted to follow the mainstream of the empirical dynamic growth
literature, we now turn to check whether this latter result is sensitive to how we
measure growth. Thus, in keeping with standard practice, the rest of the analysis and
discussions in this paper refer to the regressions with controls for human capital and in
which growth is approximated by the logarithmic difference of GDP per capita.
23.
Tables 4 to 6 report the estimates for the GMM and the other two estimation methods
used for comparison. The first column of each table shows the results when using
OLS, while the last three columns show the panel results. Column 2 in each table
shows the results when using the within group estimator, while columns 3 and 4
present results obtained using the system GMM. Results in column 3, like columns 1
and 2, are based on the linear specification (7), whereas column 4 reports results based
on the non-linear model (8) – the model with the interaction term. On the whole, the
results obtained from the system GMM (columns 3 and 4) are qualitatively consistent
with the results reported in Tables C4 to C6. The arrangements of signs and
significance of the estimated coefficients remain largely unchanged. The results
suggest that how growth is measured does not really matter, at least in qualitative
terms. Quantitatively, however, compared with Tables C4 to C6 the parameter
estimates in Tables 4 to 6 are quite small in absolute terms. For example, while the
estimated coefficients on TARIFF and  1 *ln it TARIFF Y −  in column 2 of Table C4 are
0.202(0.045) and -0.031(0.007) respectively, the corresponding estimates in column 4
of Table 4 are respectively 0.0134(0.0018) and -0.0021(0.0003). The extreme
differences in the parameter estimates raise concerns about the appropriateness of
using the WDI growth rates as the dependent variable in a dynamic growth model.
                                                
23 All the accessible dynamic growth literature using GMM (including the ones cited in this paper)
measures growth as the logarithmic difference of GDP per capita. With the exception of Hoeffler
(2002), all the studies include some measure of human capital investment and none (including Hoeffler)
include FDI as explanatory variables. The study by Hoeffler was a direct reaction to Sachs and Warner
(1997a, b). The objective was to show that cross-sectional regressions which fail to deal with the
problems of endogeneity and correlation can provide misleading results. The strategy is to replicate
Sachs and Warner’s regressions in a dynamic framework using GMM. Since Sachs and Warner did not
explicitly control for c human capital, Hoeffler did not include human capital as well in her study.42
42
Table C1
Trade Policy-TARIFF-and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):






Lagged Growth 0.295 0.319
  (9.39)**  (9.92)**





  (8.09)**   (7.97)**
FDI 0.137 0.274
 (2.24)*  (2.43)*
TARIFF 0.025 -0.229
  (3.73)**   (3.73)**
TARIFF* t-1 lnY 0.044
  (4.41)**
Constant -5.66 1.081
  (5.23)**  (0.51)
Sargan Test [0.583] [0.756]
1
st  Order Serial Correlation [0.021] [0.010]
2
nd Order Serial Correlation [0.711] [0.694]
Observations 170 170
Number of Countries 48 48
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses while p-values in brackets, * denotes significant at 10%; **
denotes significant at 5%.
1. Time dummies (not reported) are included to capture the effects of cyclical impacts on growth.
2. The Sargan test is for the validity of the set of instruments.
3. The tests for 1st and 2nd - order serial correlation are asymptotically distributed as standard normal
variables (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). The p-values report the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis of serial correlation, where the first differencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the
time-varying component of the error term in levels is a serially uncorrelated disturbance.
Table C243
43
Trade Policy-MTAX-and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):





Lagged Growth 0.218 0.244
   (11.69)**   (7.82)**
t-1 lnY 0.108 -1.126
(1.02)   (4.51)**
POP -0.743 -0.73
  (4.63)**  (3.77)**
INV 0.165 0.147
  (9.57)**   (6.80)**
FDI 0.065 0.279
(0.74)   (2.69)**
MTAX -0.02 -0.624
 (2.37)*   (5.40)**
MTAX* t-1 lnY 0.10
 (5.32)**
Constant -0.679 6.165
 (0.81)  (3.70)**
Sargan Test [0.782] [0.843]
1
st  Order serial correlation [0.002] [0.003]
2
nd Order serial correlation [0.244] [0.380]
Observations 163 163
Number of Countries 48 48
Notes: Same as for Table C1.
Table C3
Trade Policy-XTAX-and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent variable is Per Capita GDP Growth (WDI)
Explanatory variables: [1] [2]44
44
SIMPLE LINEAR INTERACTION
Lagged Growth 0.174 0.245
(7.65)** (8.10)**
t-1 lnY              -0.014 0.057
             (0.20)              (0.62)
POP              -1.013              -0.733
(8.32)** (6.37)**










Sargan Test [0.697] [0.813]
1
st  Order serial correlation [0.003] [0.003]
2
nd Order serial correlation [0.284] [0.240]
Observations 163 163
Number of Countries 48 48
Notes: Same as for Table C1.
Table C4
Trade Policy-TARIFF-and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is Per Capita GDP Growth (WDI)
                                      SIMPLE LINEAR               INTERACTION45
45
                        [1]                    [2]           
                                     SYS-GMM                     SYS-GMM
Lagged Growth    0.180***     0.092*
(0.038) (0.048)
t-1 lnY             -0.926*** -0.190
                  (0.269)  (0.280)
POP                        -1.916*** -1.661***
                  (0.407) (0.195)
INV                    0.095***     0.223***
                  (0.020)  (0.024)
SEC                  0.076***    0.042***                 
(0.010)    (0.011)
TARIFF              -0.018**       0.202***
                 (0.007)  (0.045)
TARIFF *  t-1 lnY                           -0.031***
                                                       (0.007)
Constant             5.724** -1.365
                              (2.339)  (1.315)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                             1.903***     1.631***
                                 (0.246)   (0.237)
1988-91                              1.713***    1.111***
                                 (0.255)  (0.159)
1992-95                              0.621***  0.449***
                                (0.131)  (0.117)
Sargan  Test [0.852]    [0.989]
1
st-order serial correlation [0.029]     [0.034]
2
nd-order serial correlation [0.856]     [0.806]
Observations            136                 136
Notes: Same as for Table 4.
Table C5
Trade Policy -MTAX - and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is Per Capita GDP Growth (WDI)
                                        SIMPLE LINEAR                INTERACTION46
46
                             [1]                      [2]           
                          SYS-GMM                     SYS-GMM
Lagged Growth         0.142***        0.138***
                                                          (0.020) (0.022)
t-1 lnY             -0.812***    -0.231
                           (0.128) (0.232)
POP            -1.496***     -2.582***
                       (0.280) (0.447)
INV                         0.132***    0.092**
                       (0.022) (0.035)
SEC               0.064***         0.043***
                       (0.009) (0.011)
MTAX                    -0.087***        0.198**
                      (0.008) (0.096)
MTAX *  t-1 lnY                                         -0.036**
                                                     (0.015)
Constant        4.525***          5.726***
                       (1.012)    (2.063)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                                  1.792***
                                     (0.240)
1988-91                                  1.726***    -0.126
                                     (0.178) (0.174)
1992-95                                 0.513***  -1.493***
                                      (0.110) (0.252)
1996-99                                         -1.925***
                                (0.319)
Sargan Test       [0.955]   [0.996]
1
st-order serial correlation      [0.018]   [0.019]
2
nd-order serial correlation       [0.550]   [0.495]
Observations                            132                     132
Notes: Same as for Table 4.
Table C6
Trade Policy -XTAX - and Growth in Developing Countries (1980-1999):
Dependent Variable is Per Capita GDP Growth (WDI)
                                          SIMPLE LINEAR              INTERACTION47
47
                              [1]                        [2]
                                            SYS-GMM                      SYS-GMM
Lagged Growth       0.213***               0.172***
                                                        (0.025)              (0.033)
t-1 lnY                -0.389**     -0.341**                  
 (0.150)        (0.164)
POP                -1.465***         -1.881***
                    (0.251)         (0.294)
INV                      0.094***            0.139***
                     (0.019)         (0.030)
SEC                      0.066***            0.025***
                                 (0.009)         (0.007)
XTAX                   -0.022            0.002                    
             (0.043)         (0.088)
XTAX * t-1 lnY                                                   -0.009
                                                                       (0.017)
Constant                    2.817            2.729
                                  (1.680)         (1.664)
Period Dummies:
1984-87                                     1.543***
                                        (0.201)
1988-91                                0.199           1.388***
(0.158)         (0.148)
1992-95                             -1.411***           0.399***                               
(0.146)         (0.110)
1996-99                             -2.062***
                                   (0.183)
Sargan Test    [0.641]         [0.985]
1
st-order serial correlation    [0.012]          [0.014]
2
nd-order serial correlation   [0.564]          [0.573]
Observations                        132             132
Notes: Same as for Table 4.